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Woodford v. Visciotti
123 S. Ct. 357 (2002)
L Facts
John Louis Visciotti ("Visciotti") and a co-worker, Brian Hefner ("Hefner"),
planned to rob two of their fellow employees, Timothy Dykstra ("Dykstra'" and
Michael Wolbert ("Wolbert"), on their payday, November 8, 1982. They invited
Dykstra and Wolbert to a party and the four of them rode in Wolbert's car to the
supposed destination. When they reached a remote area, Visciotti asked Wolbert
to stop so that he could relieve himself. Once all four men left the car, Visciotti
pulled out a gun and demanded the victims' money. After Hefner retrieved the
money from the car, Visciotti shot Dykstra in the chest, and then shot Wolbert
in the torso, the left shoulder, and the left eye. Visciotti and Hefner then fled the
scene in Wolbert's car.'
Wolbert survived and testified against Visciotti and Hefner.2 A California
jury convicted Visciotti of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and armed
robbery.3  The jury also made a special-circumstance finding that Visciotti
committed the murder during the commission of a robbery.4 The jury returned
a penalty verdict of death, and the trial judge imposed the death sentence.' The
Supreme Court of California ("California court") affirmed the conviction and
sentence.6
Visciotti alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition to the
California court for a writ of habeas corpus.7 After an evidentiary hearing before
a referee and a briefing on the merits, the court denied Visciotti's petition.8 The
California court assumed that Visciotti's trial counsel provided inadequate
assistance during the penalty phase, but it concluded that his counsel's ineffec-
tiveness did not prejudice the jury's sentencing decision.9
1. Woodford v. Viscioti, 123 S. Ct. 357, 358 (2002) (per curiam).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see a/so CAL. PENALCODE § 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988) (stating that penalty for
murder in first degree shall be death or fife imprisonment if special circumstance is found that
murder was committed during commission of robbery).
5. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 357; People v. Visciotri, 825 P.2d 388, 398 (Cal. 1992) ("Visdol"
F").
6. Visdotti I, 825 P.2d at 399.
7. Voodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358.
8. In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987, 987 (Cal. 1996).
9. W~oodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358. Interestingly enough, the California court assumed inade-
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Visciotti then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California.1" The district court granted the
habeas petition as to his sentence because it found that Visciotti had been denied
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase." The State appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."2 The Ninth Circuit
found that the decision of the Supreme Court of California "ran afoul of both
the 'contrary to' and the 'unreasonable application' conditions" of § 2254(d)(1)
and affirmed the district court's grant of the habeas petition. 3 The State ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.'
4
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.' In a per curiam
opinion with no dissents, the Court held that: (1) the decision of the California
court to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not contrary to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington;6 and (2) the
decision of the California court did not involve an unreasonable application of
the Court's clearly established precedents. 7
IfI. Anaysis
A. Probabihy and the Strickland Standard
The Court first addressed the Ninth Circuit's holding regarding the "con-
trary to" standard of§ 2254." According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit wrongly
concluded that the California court held Visciotti to a standard of proof higher
quate representation before finding that Visciotti suffered no prejudice. Id. Bet see Hedrick v.
Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840, 862-63 (Va. 2002) (Kinser, J., concurring) (stating that when it is easier
to dispose of ineffectiveness claim because petitioner failed to show sufficient prejudice, disposing
quickly on such grounds is best course to follow). For a complete discussion and analysis of
Hedrick, see generally Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 479 (2003) (analyzing Hedrick v.
Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840 (Va. 2002)).
10. IWoodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
state court decision can only be granted if state court decision was contrary to or unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law; part of AEDPA).
14. IWoodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358.
15. Id. at 357.
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. IWoodford, 123 S. Ct. at 359-61; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688,694 (1984)
(holding that in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that coun-
sel's representation fell below objective standard of reasonableness and that reasonable probability
exists that result of proceeding would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors).
18. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358-59; see § 2254(d)(1).
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than the case warranted because the Ninth Circuit relied on "three places (there
was in fact a fourth) [where] the opinion used the term 'probable' without the
modifier 'reasonably.' ...9 In fact, the California court began analyzing the
"reasonable probability" standard by citing the relevant passage from Strickland;
furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he question we must answer is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors and omissions, the
sentencing authority would have found that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating factors did not warrant imposition of the death penalty," and again
cited Strickland.2 The Supreme Court also cited a long passage from the Califor-
nia court's opinion in which that court asked, and answered, " 'What kind of
evidentiary showing will undermine confidence in the outcome of a penalty trial
that has resulted in a death verdict? Strickland (3)27 [sic] and the cases it cites
offer some guidance.' "2 The Supreme Court added that the "undermining
confidence" standard employed by the California court was "exactly Strickland's
description" of the reasonable probability standard.'
The Court compared the Ninth Circuit's opinion with the Court's holding
in Strickland, in which the Court held that a defendant proves prejudice by
establishing a" 'reasonabkprobabi4y that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.' "' The Court added
that Strickland "specifically rejected" the idea that a defendant must prove by a
preponderance that the outcome would have been different.24 The Supreme
Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the California court held
Visciotti to the rejected "more likely than not" standard in order for him to
prove that the result of the sentencing phase would have been different.' The
Court found that the Ninth Circuit mischaracterized the California court's
opinion and that the California court "expressed and applied the proper standard
for evaluating prejudice."26
The Court was troubled by the Ninth Circuit's "readiness to attribute error"
because the Ninth Circuit did not presume "that state courts know and follow
the law" and § 2254(d) accords a " 'highly deferential standard' " to state court
rulings.27 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit should have given the Califor-
nia court decision "the benefit of the doubt. '2' The Ninth Circuit failed to do
19. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 358-59 (citing Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1108-09,
1109 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Visdotli Ir)).
20. Id. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting In tv Visdotti, 926 P.2d at 1003).
21. Id. (quoting In re Visdotti, 926 P.2d at 1004).
22. Id.
23. Id (emphasis in Voodford) (quoting Stnckland, 466 U.S. at 694).
24. Id. (citing Stickand, 466 U.S. at 693).
25. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 359.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 360 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).
28. Id.
2003]
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so by making "no effort" to reconcile the California court's use of "probable" in
some parts of the opinion with its use of "reasonably probable" in other parts.29
The Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to acknowledge or
discuss the California court's "proper framing of the question as whether the
evidence 'undermines confidence' in the outcome of the sentencing proceed-
ing.",30 As a result, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit inappropriately applied
the "contrary to" standard of § 2254(d)(1).
3
1
B. Unrasonable Application of Ckar# Established Federal Law
The Ninth Circuit found that the California court's decision that Visciotti
suffered no prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness was "'objectively unrea-
sonable.' 32 The Ninth Circuit based its decision on its perception that the
California court did not consider either the totality of the mitigating evidence or
the prejudice created by defense counsel's actions.33 The Supreme Court,
however, found no basis for the Ninth Circuit's finding regarding prejudice.34
The Court stated that this evidence was, in fact, addressed by the California court
in its "lengthy and careful opinion., 31 Specifically, the Court cited the Ninth
Circuit's assertion that the California court" 'completely ignored the mitigating
effect of Visciotti's brain damage,' " and that the California court did not con-
sider the prejudice incurred by defense counsel's" 'multiple concessions during
closing argument.' ,,36 The California court, however, specifically considered an
expert's testimony, during the guilt phase, that Visciotti had a brain injury
associated with certain disorders. 37 The California court also noted that, through
the trial court's instructions, the expert's testimony and other evidence may have
been considered as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase despite the
concessions Visciotti's counsel made during closing argument.
3
Contrary to the findings of the California court, the Ninth Circuit also
concluded "that the 'aggravating factors were not overwhelming.' ""' The
California court considered the aggravating factors so severe, based on the "cold-
blooded execution-style killing of one victim and attempted execution-style
killing of another," and the aggravating evidence of other offenses, including "the
knifing of one man, and the stabbing of a pregnant woman as she lay in bed
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 360.
32. Id. (quoting VisdottiI, 288 F.3d at 1118); see § 2254(d)(1).
33. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 360.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Visdoti II, 288 F.3d at 1118).
37. Id. (quoting In tv Visdotti, 926 P.2d at 1004).
38. Id. at 360-61.
39. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (quoting Visdotli I, 288 F.3d at 1118).
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trying to protect her unborn baby," that it considered Visciotti to have suffered
no prejudice from his counsel's assumed inadequacy." The Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the California court based on the fact that "the jury deliberated
for a full day and requested additional guidance on the meaning of 'moral justifica-
tion' and 'extreme duress.' ,41 In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the jury's actions
"meant that the 'aggravating factors were not overwhelming.' ,,42
The Supreme Court did not disagree with the Ninth Circuit's assessment of
the aggravating factors.43 It found, however, that the Ninth Circuit's holding was
incorrect because " 'under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal
habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied
Strickland incorrectly.' "' Under § 2254(d)(1), primary responsibility for the
application of Strickland lies primarily with state courts.4 5 The Court asserted that
the federal courts should intervene "only when a state-court decision is objec-
tively unreasonable. '46 The Court emphasized that "[ain 'unreasonable application
of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,' " and that
the habeas applicant has the burden of showing that "the state court applied
Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 47 The
Court did not say whether it would reach the same conclusion as the California
court, but only that it thought "at the very least that the state court's contrary
assessment was not 'unreasonable.' "' The Court found, therefore, that habeas
relief was not permissible under § 2254(d).49
IV. Appfication in Virginia
The Court's holding confirms that state courts will receive much deference
in their habeas decisions.5" After Voodford, it appears that the Supreme Court will
not find that a state court decision violated the "contrary to" standard as long as
40. Id. (citing In re Visdotfi, 926 P.2d at 1005).
41. Id. (quoting Visaotli H, 288 F.3d at 1118).
42. Id. (quoting Visdotfi11, 288 F.3d at 1118). The Court also noted that the California court
had examined the failure of Visciotti's counsel to discover and introduce mitigating evidence about
Visciotti's " 'troubled family background' " and other evidence regarding his self-esteem and a
possible seizure disorder from which he may have been suffering. Id. (quoting In re Visdotti, 926
P.2d at 996-98, 1005). The California court, however, considered the aggravating factors to be
overwhelming. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2002)). For a complete discussion and
analysis of Bell, see generally Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 127 (2002)
(analyzing Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843 (2002)).
45. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 361; see § 2254 (d)(1).
46. Woodford, 123 S. Ct. at 361.
47. Id. at 360 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
48. Id. at 361 (quoting Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1853-54).
49. Id.
50. See generaly Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1852.
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the court recites the relevant words from previous Supreme Court opinions.
Nonetheless, if a defendant can convince the federal habeas court that the state
court incorrectly stated the relevant standard, the writ should issue under the
"contrary to" prong of § 2254(d)(1). If the state court correctly stated the legal
standard, the defendant can prevail only by convincing the federal habeas court
that the state court's application of that legal standard to the facts was "unreason-
able.""1 A simply incorrect application of law to fact will not suffice.12 Woodford
states that "unreasonable" means "objectively unreasonable," but the standard
as applied appears in actuality to mean "incomprehensible."
V. Condusion
Federal habeas petitioners must be aware of the standards they must meet
in order to have a writ of habeas corpus granted by a federal court. The Woodford
standard gives state courts much deference in a habeas proceeding. Habeas
petitioners, therefore, must consider even more carefully the positions taken in
their habeas petitions before proceeding to federal court.
Philip H. Yoon
51. This analysis does not consider the "unreasonable determination of facts" portion of
AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000) (stating that writ of habeas corpus pursuant to state
court decision can only be granted if state court decision was based on unreasonable determination
of facts in light of evidence from state court proceeding; part of AEDPA).
52. See id
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